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Abstract 
There is a genuine desire in Romanian research institutions to follow the rules of scientific evaluation tested 
over the decades in stronger academic and scientific communities such as those in the USA or the Western 
Europe countries. The main objective of our paper is to show that before enthusiastically embracing such rules 
of scientific merits evaluation a closer analysis of those norms is in order. Although the peer review system is the 
best method used so far, we have to analyse it and even criticize it in order to improve it. There are two points to 
be discussed in view of offering the right perspective on how the rules of scientific merits evaluation function: the 
peer-review system and the number of citations criterion. In the first part of our paper we shall investigate the 
shortcomings of the peer-review and the particular situations proving that the double blind review system does 
not always work to the benefit of scientific progress. In the second part of our study we shall examine the 
formalism undermining the number of citations criterion and show that we can find better alternatives. Those 
alternatives are not mere speculations: even prestigious institutions such as “Natural Science and Engineering 
Research Council of Canada” for example are giving up on the “classical” way of evaluating the scientific 
merits of researchers by shifting towards the content of the articles and not the number of their citations. 
Keywords: scientific research, the evaluation of scientific research merits, the peer-review system, the number of 
citations criterion, criticisms of the peer-review system 
Introduction
Each state in the European Union has institutions that govern the research by establishing 
research merits criteria and funds distribution rules. The process of evaluating the importance of 
research is based on several elements. The most important are: publications in prestigious academic 
journals, winning research grants and established reputation in the field. A century ago, when the 
scientific community was small there was no need for objective criteria in establishing one’s research 
merits. The growing number of universities and research institutions as well as the allocation of 
important amounts of money in the science field called up for objective rules of establishing the 
importance  of  scientific research. The three  elements mentioned  above are  to be  translated into 
quantifiable  terms  in  order  to  obtain  objective  criteria  of  evaluation.  For  instance,  what  does 
“prestigious” mean? A century ago, there was no challenge into giving a largely accepted meaning to 
this  term.  Nowadays,  “prestigious”  could  mean  a  lot  of  things,  not  all  of  them  being  close  to 
scientific research. This is why the above mentioned institutions have to come up with objective and 
relevant  means  of  establishing  the  criteria  an  academic  journal  has  to  follow  in  order  to  be 
prestigious, or what it means for a researcher to have a good reputation. The main purpose of this 
paper is to prove that, although the intentions may be honourable, the result of translating terms like 
“prestigious” or “good reputation” into quantified parameters has its shortcomings. Thus, the most 
important weakness of this system is the fact that it relies on quantity instead of the quality of 
scientific endeavour. Those three elements mentioned above are closely connected to each other. 
Thus in order to gain a good reputation, a researcher has to publish, (or else perish) in prestigious 
journals. Moreover, the researcher’s articles must have enough citations for his/her research to be 
considered important. After gaining a good reputation based on the type of journals the articles are 
  Lecturer  Ph.D,  Journalism,  Communication  and  Public  Relations  Faculty,  “Spiru  Haret” University, 
Bucharest, (e-mail: macernat@gmail.com) 1934  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Administration
published in and on the number of citations, the researcher can send applications to receive funds to 
support his or her scientific projects.  
2. The Oz-Behind the Curtain Effect and the Peer Review System 
The peer-review system is important also for the academic journals as well as for gaining 
access to research grants. This is why we think that it is crucial to have a debate over this way of 
evaluating academic journals and scientific applications. Maybe we could say the same thing about 
the peer-review as Churchill said about democracy. That is, “the worst form of government except all 
those other forms that have been tried from time to time”. But since it represents such an important 
element in establishing what is the relevant research, how articles are selected and who is to be 
considered an important researcher, we consider it is vital to have an ongoing debate on the ways of 
criticizing and improving it.  
First  of all we should explain what the term “peer-review” means.  This  term is  used to 
designate a way of self-regulating used by a certain profession. The term “peer” means „One of the 
same rank, quality, endowments, character, etc.; an equal; a match; a mate”
1. The term review means 
„A critical examination of a publication, with remarks; a criticism; a critique”
2. The meaning of the 
two terms leads to the understanding of this collocation: the peer-review system refers to the situation 
where people having the same academic rank are asked to read and make a fair evaluation of an 
article recommending its publication or rejection. This works the same for the scientific projects that 
are evaluated by the same system. It now becomes clear that the judgements of colleagues play a 
crucial part in the way grants are distributed and articles selected in order to be published, and 
eventually on the way individual careers might evolve.    
There were numerous scandals undermining the ethics of the peer review system. Several 
examples proved the system to be failing when it was put to the test. A famous cardiologist cooked 
his data but the study was published in the most prestigious medical journal. A famous researcher 
intentionally published a study based on data that proved to be bogus and the peers reviewing it 
failed to see that. It was only after his self-denouncement that the scientific community realised the 
failures of the work. Are those isolated situations or is the system responsible for those failures? In 
order to answer this question we have to take a closer look to the way this system works.  
The Oz-behind the curtain effect refers to the fact that the peers reviewing the scientific 
articles are working anonymously. The main reason academic journals use this particular procedure 
is due to the fact that by hiding the identity of the peers those academics will be protected against any 
kind of influence by their colleagues. But this is a blade cutting both sides: while protecting the 
referees it offers them the possibility, while hiding their identity, to act arbitrarily. This is the reason 
why in the United States even the Congress investigated the peer review system, which had been 
seriously questioned after a series of frauds and unethical scientific behaviours.  
As Tom Abate points out, “whether grading grants or screening articles, a peer reviewer must 
preserve  scholarly  integrity  by  rising  above  the  three  deadly  sins  of  intellectual  life:  envy, 
favouritism, and the temptation to plagiarize”
3 This is an example where the pure proceduralism 
encounters  its  main  obstacle:  no  matter  how  well  designed  the  procedure  may  be,  the  persons 
implementing it have to possess important moral traits in the absence of which the procedure has no 
chance to be successful. There are two ways of establishing scientific merits: by relying on authority, 
thus turning to important personalities in the field, or by relying on colleagues to fairly review the 
scientific  articles.  The  peer  review system  finds  itself  closer to  the  second  way  of establishing 
scientific merits. But this procedure is not by itself enough to ensure an objective way of screening 
scientific  articles  and  projects.  Moreover,  “the  persons  most  qualified  to  judge  the  worth  of  a 
scientist's grant proposal or the merit of a submitted research paper are precisely those who are the 
scientist's closest competitors”
4 The hidden philosophical assumption of the peer-review system is 
that relying on a procedure is better than relying on authority. The ethical problem resulting from this 
assumption parallels the one encountered by one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth 1935
century, John Rawls. When trying to sketch an outline of a procedure decision in ethics
5, Rawls 
wanted to rely only on the fairness of his procedure but soon found himself in the difficult position of 
assigning a long list of intellectual and moral traits to those appointed to implement it – the moral 
judges.
It  was  precisely  the  unethical  behaviour  of  the  reviewers  that  called  for  the  Congress 
investigation. Thus in 1994 the General Accounting Office, an investigating department of the US 
Congress, issued a 133 page report regarding the peer-review system. The report was the result of the 
examination of 246 winning and rejected grants and of interviewing 1.400 reviewers. The auditors 
found most of the criticism as being well founded, but that the system was functioning reasonably 
well. A first measure to be taken in order to improve this system was to add more women and 
representatives of the minorities in the review process. A second measure taken at the end of the 
Second International Congress on Peer Review in Biomedical Publication in 1993 was the blind 
review procedure that will grant the researchers the opportunity of a fair trial as a result of the fact 
that the identity of those applying for grants or sending articles to be published was to be hidden from 
the reviewers. 
3. The Peer-Review System and the Case of Analytical versus Continental Philosophy 
There is a case where even this improved peer-review system does not work. It is the case of 
philosophy,  where  most  of  the  academic  journals  favour  the  analytical  way  of  philosophical 
investigation. This is a situation that calls for a closer look since it is the perfect example that proves 
the fact that the peer review system is completely failing. If the other cases are notorious scandals 
that can be considered as exceptions to the rule, the case of analytical philosophy is a field where this 
procedure proves to fail systematically. 
For  decades analytic  philosophy  has  been the  main  way  of doing philosophy  in  English 
speaking countries. Recent history of philosophy places us in front of a distinction between two types 
of wisdom loving, separated not only by a theoretical boundary but also by a spatial delimitation: 
analytic  philosophy  (specific to  North American  and  British  space)  and continental  philosophy. 
Throughout  the  century  numerous  conflicts  emerged  between  the  representatives  of  the  two 
philosophical trends, which have considerably undermined the possibility of a constructive dialogue. 
Based on solid knowledge of mathematical logic, most analytic philosophers consider that the sole 
task of philosophy is to investigate the language for the therapeutic purpose of preventing us from 
attempting to solve problems or, more exactly, pseudo-problems such as the existence of good, of 
divinity  or  the  existence  of  beauty.  The  war  declared  to  all  types  of  metaphysics  regards  the 
exclusion from the field of serious philosophical concerns of all problems this venerable discipline 
has tried to find an answer to for centuries. To ask ourselves what reality is or what reality looks like 
is a pseudo-problem which, at most, has the chance to charm our intellect by means of our language. 
The correct way of approaching this matter is to investigate the latent ontological presuppositions of 
a  statement  about  reality.  What  differentiates,  however  the  analytic  philosophers  from  the 
representatives of phenomenology (especially from the works of Martin Heidegger) is not only a net 
detachment from metaphysical problems. The direct consequence of reducing metaphysical attempts 
to find answers to pseudo-problems is completely ignoring the history of philosophy. For centuries 
philosophy has been associated with the assimilation of important works of predecessors but the 20th 
century  meant  for  the  North  American  and  British  philosophers  an  almost  total  exclusion  of 
endeavours connected with the study of ancient or modern philosophers. Phrases of the type „he who 
doesn’t know his history is forced to repeat its errors” do not seem to represent a serious threat. Since 
all metaphysicians’ problems are pseudo-problems, the investigation of ancient, modern or even 
analytic thinkers is, at most, a historical effort, labelled as philosophical history and not as authentic 
philosophy.  
However strange it may seem for a person educated within an academic environment such as 
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field,  in  the  United  States  it  is  possible,  at  least  theoretically,  to  reach  the  highest  academic 
distinction (PhD) without reading a single page of Aristotle or Kant. The programmatic and complete 
isolation  from  the  philosophical  past  represents  a  completely  exceptional  fact  in  the  history  of 
philosophy.  It  is  unlikely  that  one  might  identify  such  a  programmatic  detachment  from  the 
significant works of the past in any of the other sciences, be that exact or humanistic. Lost in sterile 
disputes, most of the times dominated by personal egos, phenomenologist and analytic philosophers 
seem to ignore this very extraordinary fact. Since this way of doing philosophy has managed to keep 
the most important American and British philosophers captive for a century, one should initially look 
not only for the social but for the theoretical resources that made this thing possible.  
Another  unprecedented  element  is  the  fact  that  debates  represent  an  essential  feature  of 
analytical philosophy. However, attempts to make an analysis of the analysis, a criticism of analytical 
philosophy, emerged only recently, accidentally or not, their appearance coinciding with the pluralist 
revolt in 1978. The history of analytic philosophy made by analytic philosophers is, in general, an 
enumeration of important philosophers, of the works and their significant contributions in the field. 
There are, of course, notable exceptions: M. Dummett (trying to determine the origins of analytic 
philosophy), P.F. Strawson,( interested in identifying the Kantian roots of analytic philosophy)
6, J 
Floyd  (who  focuses  on  early  analytic  philosophy)
7,  D.  Follesdal,  (trying  to  offer  a  historical 
explanation for the analytic philosophy domination in USA)
8. Still, critical approaches to this type of 
doing  philosophy,  a  self-criticism,  from  the  perspective  of  philosophical  or  metaphilosophical 
history, are, as previously mentioned, recent attempts. Criticisms coming from those who chose 
another way of looking at this issue are extremely vulnerable. As previously mentioned, in 1978 a 
conflict emerged in the United States, which has been imprinted in the history of philosophy as the 
pluralist revolt. We can not offer here a detailed account of this outstanding event of the recent 
history  of  philosophy.  Nevertheless,  we  shall  use  this  situation  to  attract  attention  on  the 
incommensurability  of  the  philosophical  paradigms,  which  make  even  reciprocal  criticism 
impossible.  During  this  revolt  of  the  phenomenological  philosophers  against  the  analytical 
philosophers, Bruce Wilshire, a professor at Rutgers University since 1970 and a promoter of the 
revolt,  launches  himself  in  a  dispute  with  Quine:  “I  myself  get  a  frigid  letter  from  Quine.  Its 
reasoning was so elaborate, condensed, and mathematical that I hat great difficulty following it, 
though I read it several times. I am unable to judge the validity of his argument. Perhaps he intended 
to teach me –existentially, so to speak, or as a Zen master might – that I was incompetent”
7. This 
dialogue between philosophers coming from different schools shows that the best way to investigate 
what we actually mean by the concept of analytic philosophy and the potential problems arising in 
the approach to doing philosophy is represented by the efforts of somebody with a background in this 
philosophical tradition.  
If  we  were  to  follow  the  Rawlsian  idea  stipulating  that  an  essential  condition  for  the 
possibility  of  solving  a  conflict  is  each  adversaries’  capacity  to  formulate  criticisms  in  terms 
acceptable to the other, we could notice that it cannot be respected by the representatives of the two 
traditions. A  close analysis of the “inner criticisms” is  much more fertile  because it  can  reveal 
elements  pertaining  to  the  theoretical  resources  that  enabled  analytical  philosophy  to  settle 
comfortably in the North American and British space for almost a century. 
The explanations offered for this unusual turn generally give a privileged position to the 
social, historical and institutional conditions which lead to the sometimes arbitrary acknowledgement 
of  a  single  trend  in  the  philosophical  investigation.  This  is  about  analytical  philosophy 
representatives  holding  leadership  positions  for  decades  within  the  most  important  professional 
association  (American  Philosophical  Association),  which  is  very  influential  in  controlling  the 
distribution of funds for research or the labour market for philosophers. In this context one could also 
consider the above mentioned pluralist revolt which included, among others, the possibility to do 
another  type  of  philosophy  in  the  US  and  to  offer  students  other  approaches  to  philosophical 
reflection. 1937
This heated debate between the two types of wisdom lovers shows us how the peer-review 
system is failing to do them justice. That is, it was not the persons the main analytical journals turn 
their  criticism  to,  but  a  way  of  doing  philosophy.  This  way,  if  a  philosopher  wanted  to  write 
something on  Plato’s dialogues  or  Aquinas’s  theological  arguments,  it  was  the  very nature  and 
content of their study that made them not eligible for publication in mainstream journals. Even if 
famous analytical philosophers gave up their previous convictions and joined the phenomenologist in 
their way of doing philosophy their articles could not be published in prestigious journals since the 
academic world in United States was dominated by analytically oriented philosophers. 
This arguments show that this peer review system represents a proceduralistic perspective in 
assessing  the  scientific  merits  that is  not  at  all  unerring  so  one  might take  a  closer  look to  its 
criticisms before embracing it. 
4. The Number of Citations Criterion  
Another important tool in the research evaluation process is represented by the number of 
citations. This is an instrument that tries to complete the peer review system. That is, even if a study 
is published in a mainstream academic journal, if it does not leave a trace, if it is not acknowledged 
as such by the large academic community it is not considered a relevant research. That is, in order to 
ensure  a  more  “democratic”  way  of  evaluating  important  research  results  we  should  “let  the 
community  decide,  depending  on  citation,  what  would  become  permanent  electronically  or  be 
published.
”10This is the most formal and arbitrary criterion leading to unacceptable situations in the 
scientific community. This criterion resembles the high audience criteria in evaluating the quality of 
a TV Show. As the recent media history showed us the quest for higher audiences only lead to 
dramatic decrease of the quality of media shows. The same way, the rating of an article is a criterion 
that cannot function by itself. Someone could intentionally write unsubstantiated claims in order to 
attract criticism, and therefore, a large number of citations. Could such an article be considered more 
important or relevant from the point of view of scientific research? If, of the other hand, someone 
writes about using nanotechnology in finding treatments for rare diseases and the article is not cited 
enough does this make the article less valuable and less notorious? This situation made important 
institutions such as Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada to abandon such 
formal and arbitrary criteria. Let us take into a closer consideration the following rules issued by 
NSERC: 
“To focus the assessment of excellence of the researcher on the quality and impact of recent 
contributions to research, applicants are asked to identify up to five of their most significant research 
contributions in the last six years and to explain how these contributions have influenced their field 
and/or she activities of users.   
Selection  committees  and  panels  are  advised  by  NSERC  to  neither  rely  on  numbers  of 
publications  in  their  assessment  of  productivity  nor  create  or  use  lists  of  "prestigious"  or 
"unacceptable" journals in their assessment of quality. The quality of the publication's content is the 
determining factor, not that of the journal in which it appears, and the onus is on the applicant to 
provide convincing evidence of quality”.
11
These regulations are the expression of the justifiable discontent with the previous standards 
used to evaluate the quality of research, such as the prestigious peer-reviewed journals and the long 
list of citations. A common sense observation could justify such a stance: the quality of the journal 
cannot  and  should  never  replace  or stand  for  the  quality  of  the  article.  The form  –  that  is  the 
prestigious journal –  as  well as  the content  should  be  of  importance  in assessing the  merits of 
scientific research. 1938  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Administration
5. Conclusions 
The peer-review system is subject to numerous criticisms since it leads to the Oz-behind the 
curtain effect and to a form of systematic discrimination, the same as in the case of analytical versus
continental philosophy. As for the number of citations criterion, the way of establishing the quality of 
an article based solely on its higher rating is a case where even common sense intuition can prove to 
be right in rejecting it. Although it can offer an important instrument for assessing the impact and 
visibility of a scientific article it can be completely independent of the article’s quality. Scientific 
research is the field where it is not important how many people read you, but essentially who are 
those  people  reading  your  article.  Pure  academic  proceduralism  and  the  complete  disregard  for 
authority is a mere abstraction leading to unacceptable situations in the scientific community. 
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